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Abstract 
In recent years, much social scientific scholarship in sport, exercise and health (SEH) has 
repudiated (post)positivist research and has instead persuasively argued in favour of 
qualitative research from constructivist-interpretivist paradigmatic approaches. While this 
scholarship has enriched the field in numerous ways, this paper contends that constructivist-
interpretivist assumptions elicit a modus operandi which is inimical to the accomplishment of 
two associated contemporary research agendas: interdisciplinarity and impact. In seeking an 
alternative philosophy of science, the purpose of this paper is to explore how critical realism 
(Bhaskar, 1975; 1979; 1989) – meta-theoretical position that has been somewhat absent to 
date in SEH research – might offer qualitative researchers a new conceptual framework with 
which greater interdisciplinarity and impact can be achieved. Two main critical realist claims 
are introduced: (1) the epistemic fallacy can be avoided by adopting a stratified ontology and 
judgemental rationality, and (2) social science would benefit from seeking causal 
explanations and using a transformational model of social activity. By de-coupling 
interpretive epistemologies from constructivist ontologies, it is argued that critical realism 
permits greater methodological plurality and hence can help transcend persistent 
paradigmatic boundaries. Indeed, by adopting a realist social ontology and complex, 
emergent conception of causality, this paper suggests that critical realism permits and 
encourages impact by asking researchers to focus on explaining the enduring social relations 
that produce real-world problems. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of 
critical realism and highlighting other ways that interdisciplinarity and impact can similarly 
be achieved. 
 
Keywords: qualitative, methodology, ontology, critical realism, interdisciplinarity, impact. 
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Introduction  
Social science scholarship related to sport, exercise and health (SEH) has been enriched 
by a substantial growth in qualitative research in the last several decades. To echo Giardina 
(2017), the conceptual and practical resources available to students and readers undertaking 
qualitative research in the field have never been stronger. Yet, in the context of what has been 
described as an expanding and shifting community of practice characterised, in part, by its 
multiplicity (Smith and Sparkes, 2016), it is important to be reminded that a number of 
challenges for qualitative researchers remain unresolved. In this paper, particular focus is 
given to two separate but associated challenges: interdisciplinarity and impact – challenges 
that are pertinent amidst clarion calls for our research to be better at making a difference 
(Silk, Bush and Andrews, 2010; Atkinson, 2011; Pringle and Falcous, 2016) and within the 
political context of contemporary academia (Evans, 2014).  
The impact of research can be taken to mean “any identifiable benefit to or positive 
influence on the economy, society, public policy or services, culture, the environment or 
quality of life beyond academia" (HEFCE, 2016, p.4) and although the interpretation and 
measurement of impact is a matter of some debate (see Kay 2016), the basic premise that 
researchers want their work to make a difference in the ‘real world' is one which is shared by 
many (Smith, 2018). While changing the world is a difficult task in itself, what makes matters 
more difficult is that the real-world challenges that researchers hope to address often 
transcend the otherwise engrained borders between the social and natural sciences as well as 
between disciplines within the social sciences. This is particularly the case when attempting 
to meet the demands of so-called ‘grand challenges’ (e.g. physical inactivity, mental ill-
health, obesity, climate change etc.). To have impact, then, interdisciplinary research which 
seeks productive and harmonious collaboration across disciplines and across methodological 
traditions is likely to be essential. This may be especially challenging for qualitative 
researchers whose contribution to interdisciplinary teams has too often been reduced to being 
‘tokenistic’ (Reich and Reich, 2006), relegated to secondary capacities (Sparkes, 2015), and 
undermined by historical, institutional hierarchies of power (Sparkes, 2013). Indeed, given 
that these hierarchies of power result in a lack of parity of access to high-impact journals (see 
the #BMJnoQual debate in Greenhalgh et al., 2016; Clark and Thompson, 2016) it is not 
suprising that interdisciplinarity and impact remain challenging for qualitative researchers.  
To achieve greater interdisciplinarity, some have prompted the community to consider 
‘border-crossing’ as a political strategy (Evans, 2014; Kay, 2016; Pringle and Falcous, 2016) 
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while others suggest the need to “find new strategic and tactical ways to work with one 
another” (Sparkes and Smith, 2013, p.242). Similarly, Phoenix et al. (2013) reflect on 
conducting research as part of an interdisciplinary team arguing for increasing our tolerance 
of different paradigms within research teams and to avoid framing interdisciplinary work 
within a single paradigm. Yet, Giardina (2017, p.265) rightly alerts us that we should not take 
lightly the tension that exists between “the necessity of undertaking funded research (which 
often comes with the price of making methodological concessions, especially to mixed 
methods) and maintaining epistemological and ontological coherence.” As such, by 
approaching interdisciplinarity in strategic and tactical ways, researchers will likely find 
themselves in the paradoxical position of trying to find practical commensurability while 
maintaining that paradigms are theoretically incommensurable. Hence, while these reflections 
are helpful in allowing researchers to meet the demands of interdisciplinarity in practice, they 
come with a sense of compromise and lack of philosophical reconciliation. 
In search of a path through these challenges, this paper departs from the previous 
recommendations which have been explored elsewhere and instead makes the case for 
revisiting the constructivist-interpretivist paradigmatic orientations that have come to 
dominate qualitative research in SEH in recent years. As an alternative, this paper explores 
the potential of critical realism as meta-theoretical position within which qualitative research 
can be conceived of and produced. In doing so, one of the key objectives of this paper is to 
reflect on how ‘our own’ orientations (insofar as qualitative researchers in SEH can be 
thought of as such) might open new research opportunities and possibilities, yet may 
constrain our research in other important ways.  
 
On the limits of constructivist-interpretivist paradigms 
It is necessary to preface the case for critical realism with some reflections on the 
limitations of the constructivist-intetrpretivist orientations that are prevalent in the field. Prior 
to presenting these arguments, it is important to respectfully recognise and praise the research 
that has emerged from the qualitative community of practice in SEH with the deep 
understanding that much has been gained from its critical attention to complexity, richness, 
subjective lived experience and the like. Arguments are presented here not simply for the 
sake of negative critique, but with the aim of inviting reflection and discussion and in an 
attempt to speak to pertinent philosophical and practical issues.  
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While it should, of course, be acknowledged that qualitative research in SEH is far 
from a precisely defined ‘field’ with a homogenous approach to the research process, there 
are a number of common and general characteristics that have emerged over the last two 
decades. Gibson (2016, p 385), for example, notes that “qualitative research has often been 
deployed as a label for any research that takes place in opposition to postpositivism.” He goes 
on to describe qualitative research as, 
rejecting postpositivism in favour of developing contextual understandings of 
meaning and lived experience based on, to varying degrees, levels of emphasis, and in 
various combinations, relativist ontologies, subjectivist epistemologies, and 
hermeneutic methodologies.  
 
Indeed, while there may be numerous versions of interpretivism (Schwandt, 1998), many 
qualitative scholars have consistently defended their work on constructivist-interpretivist 
paradigmatic grounds which, as explained by Sparkes (2015, p.50), outline “a set of basic 
beliefs, and a worldview that defines, for its holder the nature of the world, our place in it, 
and the possible relationships we can have to this world and its parts”. The ‘nature of the 
world’ is a sentiment also invoked by Sparkes and Smith (2013, p.11) who make the 
argument that paradigmatic differences are grounded in ontological assumptions, claiming 
that “qualitative researchers adopt a relativist or internal ontology” which conceives of social 
reality as “humanly constructed and shaped in ways that make it fluid and multifaceted”. 
Indeed, Gill (2011, p. 307) claims, “[o]ne key assumption of qualitative research is that there 
is not one truth, but multiple truths.” While truth is an issue for both qualitative and 
quantitative research (Randall and Phoenix, 2009), for Sparkes and Smith (2013, p.14) these 
“basic philosophical differences” lead to “quantitative and qualitative researchers developing 
different research designs, using different techniques to collect different kinds of data, 
performing different types of analyses, representing their findings in different ways, and 
judging the ‘quality’ of their studies using different criteria.” This paradigmatic stance is 
shared by, Markula and Silk (2011, p.25) who write;  
Paradigms are important because they provide the boundaries for the researcher’s ethics 
and values, actions in the social world, the control of the study (who initiates the work 
and asks questions), the voices deployed in the accounts of the research and, indeed, the 
very basic and fundamental understanding of the world the researcher is investigating. 
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This logic appears in tables and matrices (see Table 1) outlining how ontology 
corresponds to epistemology, which in turn corresponds with which methodology researchers 
ought to subscribe to in order to avoid unwanted ‘mixing and matching’ (Kellie, 2009). These 
examples suggest that there exists a somewhat established idea of what it is to do qualitative 
research and, perhaps, what it means to be a qualitative researcher, beyond simply an interest 
in non-numerical data or the use of particular techniques of data collection.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
Although paradigmatic frameworks have served to embolden and legitimise qualitative 
research, we must also remain aware of the pertinent critiques of paradigmatic thinking. 
Weed (2009a, p.313), for example, raises a number of concerns, not least of which is the 
charge that Kuhn’s (1970) oft-cited The Structure of Scientific Revolutions may have been 
misinterpreted and hence the “idea of ‘competing paradigms’ would appear to be a 
misnomer”. That aside, it may also be argued that the boundaries produced and propagated 
through paradigmatic commitments ensure that the differences in research approaches remain 
well nourished. Thus, it could be argued that these paradigmatic boundaries elicit a modus 
operandi which can be inimical to the accomplishment of both interdisciplinarity and impact. 
Boundaries are antithetical to interdisciplinarity and they may be especially felt for 
researchers who position qualitative research as part of a ‘worldview’ belonging to 
researchers themselves (i.e. “the concern with one’s own epistemology and ontological 
grounding” (Giardina and Laurendeau, 2013, p.244) emphasis added). This speaks to the 
ways in which we come to understand our own subjectivities as researchers whereby 
appropriated paradigm boundaries come to be lived, felt and performed – a situation for 
which we ought to be cautious. Gard (2009), for example, warns of “complacent alliances” 
between “like minds”, and Weed (2009, p.316) raises concerns about ‘protectionist’ 
paradigmatic behaviour. 
It is not suprising, then, that when researchers with different paradigmatic assumptions 
attempt to collaborate, a number of problems can arise. Issues with working across research 
traditions bear out in the 2011 special issue of this journal on qualitative-quantitative 
divisions (Smith and Brown, 2011) as well in more recent articles concerning exercise as 
medicine (see Williams and Gibson, 2017; Williams et al., 2017; Pullen and Malcolm, 2017; 
Caddick and Smith, 2017). Williams and Gibson’s (2017) paper, for example, presents a 
fictional exchange between a critical social scientist and an exercise physiologist. As a 
response to critical comments made by the social scientist, the physiologist retorts, “I could 
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have guessed that you would want to talk about negatives, and some sort of ‘isation’. You lot 
always do.” (p.10). Furthermore, Stambulova (2016, p.452) writes about her experiences 
working with quantitative sport psychologists:  
The problem is that many career researchers with positivist and postpositivist 
backgrounds are preoccupied with research objectivity and find it difficult to shift to 
the constructionist type of thinking, with more open and interactive dialogues, the 
possibility of alternative interpretations.  
 
For some, these vivid examples of disciplinary conflict reflect “ignorance” about 
qualitative research (Gibson, 2016, p.382) and a “blinding arrogance” (Smith and Sparkes, 
2013, p.238) to privileging one’s own approach over others’  – something which both 
qualitative and quantitative researchers may be guilty of. However, Pringle and Falcous’s 
(2016) self-reflexive call for greater interdisciplinarity extends these points and argues for 
revisiting philosophy too. Reflecting on the sociology of sport, they note that “our 
predominant epistemological beliefs may be a factor that limits our ability to make a 
difference” (p. 4). They suggest that, 
there might be value in promoting greater use of quantitative, mixed method and 
interdisciplinary research approaches with the natural sciences. We acknowledge that our 
call runs counter to the epistemological orthodoxies in the field, and we feel a certain 
discomfort in doing so (p. 3).  
 
Without a rapprochement of the kind that Pringle and Falcous suggest involving the 
negotiation of certain personal ‘discomforts’ and conflicts, qualitative researchers – and 
therefore rigorous qualitative research itself – will likely be omitted from interdisciplinary 
work.  
Furthermore, as many qualitative researchers deploy constructivist-interpretivist (as well 
as post-modernist) arguments that problematise scientific evidence and, indeed, the very 
concept of truth itself, it may be difficult to work with colleagues who subscribe to the notion 
that legitimate problems exist and that a firm stance should be taken on their importance. It is 
here that both impact and interdisciplinarity intersect though ontological and epistemological 
disputes. Social constructivist arguments are presented by Sparkes and Smith (2013) who cite 
Digwell’s (1992) assertion that “[t]here are no diseases in nature, merely relationships 
between organisms... diseases are produced by the conceptual schemes imposed on the 
natural world by human beings.” These social constructivist arguments appear in Evans and 
Colls’s (2009) critical take on obesity, which is referred to – not as a disease, but – as “a 
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socially constructed and contested ‘problem’”. Similarly, Pike (2011) mobilises Foucauldian-
inspired critiques of “truth” to problematize physical activity promotion for older adults. 
These ideas have become so prevalent that Gard (2011) warns us of the dangers of SEH 
social scientists adopting an orthodoxy of obesity science scepticism by default.  
While it is not the intention of this paper to advance a whole-scale critique of these 
positions, my point is simply that these arguments make it very difficult (if not impossible) 
for qualitative researchers who endorse constructivist-interpretivist approaches to collaborate 
with researchers seeking to address grand challenges such as obesity and physical inactivity. 
How can constructivist-interpretivist researchers possibly collaborate with researchers 
committed to truth claims? How can (and why would) researchers embark on grand 
challenges when those challenges are merely constructions? Clearly, constructivist-
interpretivist critiques of ‘objective science’ are valid and important, yet they remain far more 
effective at demonstrating what knowledge should not be trusted than guiding what 
knowledge should be trusted, rendering it difficult for readers and scholar-activists to take a 
stance on crucial issues.  
Not long ago, it appeared very understandable that Sparkes (2013, p.442) would charge 
George W. Bush’s presidential administration of promoting “narrowly defined governmental 
regimes of truth” at the expense of multiple, competing truths. Five years on, however, 
scholars are showing more demur about the appeal of multiple, competing truths amidst the 
advent of the so-called ‘post-truth’ era often associated with the ‘populist’ political victories 
of Donald Trump and Brexit (see Gore’s (2016) provocative use of Calcutt’s (2016) article). 
Indeed, Bruno Latour, as one of the most proactive anti-science scholars since the late 1970s, 
has more recently reflected on the need to re-frame critiques of truth in light of such 
arguments. He writes, “Was I wrong to participate in the invention of this field known as 
science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we said? Why does it 
burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact whether you like it or not?” (Latour, 
2004, p.227). 
The limits of the constructivist-interpretivist position have also recently been 
problematised when confronted with material phenomena. Drawing heavily on feminist New 
Materialist scholarship (see Barad, 2003), Fullagar (2017, p.249) explains that 
interpretive approaches have assumed that the source of embodied meaning lies ‘within’ 
the subject as an agentic being; these include psychological theories of self-determination 
through to more phenomenological accounts of sensory experience of the world.  
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Fundamentally, this is because such assumptions are foregrounded by a certain 
humanistic anthropocentrism which “hierarchically privileges subjective human realities and 
constructions” (Ferrado, 2013, p.29). These ontological questions about the embodied self 
have led Sparkes and Smith (2011, p.366) to note, “the notion of narrative as a bio-social 
phenomenon allows for a bridge to be built between two different theoretical positions that 
might loosely be labelled ‘critical realism’ and ‘social constructivism’.”  
Building on from these anthropocentric critiques we can see how constructivist-
interpretivist assumptions also make it difficult to generalise by their insistence on the highly 
subjective, situated and interpreted status of phenomena. As such, while Kay (2016, p.425) is 
well justified in stating that “there is no mismatch or conflict between qualitative research 
and impact,” there is a strong case to argue that there is a mismatch between constructivist-
interpretivist paradigmatic positions and impact. This may partially be because the pursuit of 
solutions to real-world problems implies that researchers are able to make somewhat 
generalisable statements and must be willing to propose new ways of doing things, be they 
policies, programmes or practices that can be subject to future scrutiny. By rejecting realism 
in some form, constructivist-interpretivist scholars risk facing the long-established charge 
against relativism that it "makes radical criticism impossible, and in doing so seems to be 
self-refuting" (Edgley, 1998, p.396). As, Archer (1998, p.193) asserts, this is evident in,  
the rhetorical montage of Foucauldian aspect, whose verificatory collage works by 
persuasion without any context of justification, yet is immune to critique. Attempt the 
latter and rhetoric beats a quick epistemic retreat – it is merely rhetorical, one image in a 
new world which allows a thousand images to bloom, privileging their plurality and 
counselling us to increase our tolerance of incommensurability. 
 
Collier (1994, p.14) is similarly sceptical about relativistic claims because they are 
rendered to be "invulnerable to any criticism based on the claim that the facts are different." 
He adds that in recent years interpretivism has “enabled the theorist to say ‘since I am not 
claiming objective truth for my theories, I can go on saying what I like, and your counter-
examples have no relevance for me’.”  
These questions may be challenging for the constructivist-interpretive positions that deny 
the possibility of truth, further questions could be raised when these positions come to be 
reflected in the purposes of research. It is commonplace, for example, for qualitative 
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researchers to celebrate the notion that the “purpose of research is to offer just one of many 
possible interpretations” (Brocki and Weardon, 2006, p.98). Indeed, Sparkes and Smith 
(2013, p.12) explicitly state that, “[t]he job of qualitative researchers... is to acknowledge and 
report these different realities by relying on the voices and interpretations of the participants 
through extensive quotes, presenting themes that reflect the words and actions of participants, 
and advancing evidence of different perspectives on each theme.” While these aims will 
likely lead to rich, complex, nuanced accounts of experiences, it may be important to be 
reminded that nuance ought not to be heralded as an ultimate virtue on our inquiries (Healy, 
2016) and that explanatory theories are currently lacking. According to Archer (1998, p.194) 
this approach, “detaches social ontology from explanatory methods and practical social 
theories.” In other words, for qualitative research to be more effective at ‘making a 
difference,’ perhaps it is necessary to move beyond the search for rich, nuanced, complex 
interpretations of phenomena (although these are still needed) and towards explaining how 
social phenomena come to be.  
Amongst this disquiet is an opportunity to revisit the philosophical ground upon which 
qualitative research is frequently based and to seek robust alternatives to the constructivist-
interpretivist paradigms that allow us to maintain our research integrity without placing 
unnecessary limits on our practices. To this end, Rutzou (2016) summarises the state of play 
for many in the social sciences, particularly critical realists: 
We find ourselves at once moving beyond notions of the universal, emerging from 
postmodern deconstruction, and moving towards an era of re-construction. No longer are 
we concerned with ‘the anarchist farewell to modernity’ (Habermas, 1987, 4), instead we 
are concerned with welcoming and creating new forms of solidarity, of moving beyond 
the deconstruction of totalities and the highlighting of limitations towards new 
possibilities; possibilities which now have a difficult task of moving beyond ‘naive’ 
conceptual schemes operating on principles of closure, ‘simple’ representations, ‘simple’ 
assertions of laws or ‘simple’ conceptions of reality. A social science able to effectively 
function in a complex world.  
 
The remaining sections of this paper, therefore, seek to address this aim by outlining 
some of the basic claims of critical realism and exploring how they might benefit qualitative 
researchers seeking interdisciplinarity and impact. 
 
Critical realism 
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While a succinct definition of critical realism is likely to disingenuously simplify what is 
a diverse assemblage of ideas, it is somewhat unified in its attempt to develop a robust and 
coherent philosophy of social science capable of eschewing the perceived limitations of both 
positivism and interpretivism. As Archer et al. (2016, p.4) explain, critical realists highlight a 
dissatisfaction with,  
scientistic forms of positivism concerned with regularities, regression-based variables 
models, and the quest for law-like forms; and also to the strong interpretivist or 
postmodern turn which denies explanation in favor of interpretation, with a focus on 
hermeneutics and description at the cost of causation. 
 
At this point, it is important to emphasise that this paper provides a somewhat general 
reading of critical realism grounded in the work of Roy Bhaskar – in particular A Realist 
Theory of Science (1975), The Possibility of Naturalism (1979) and Reclaiming Reality 
(1989) – and that nuances, controversies and debates are available for exploration elsewhere 
(Archer et al., 1998; Collier; 1994; CSO, 2017; CRN, 2017). Indeed, it is also worth noting 
that some of the conclusions that are arrived at here in relation to interdisciplinarity and 
impact may be achieved through similar arguments not posited by critical realists 
specifically.  
From this foundation, notable scholars have advanced and developed critical realism 
beyond (and oftentimes critical of) Bhaskar. The work of Archer (1982; 1995; 2013) and 
Porpora (1987; 2015) in sociology, Lawson (1997; 2003) in economics, Collier (1994) in 
philosophy and Sayer (1984; 2000) in methodology have profoundly contributed to the 
emergence of critical realism as an important philosophy in contemporary social science. 
More recently, critical realism has been used to underpin Scambler’s (2001; 2013; Scambler 
and Scambler, 2015) research on health and illness, Elder-Vass’s (2010; 2012) theories of 
social structure, Bailey’s (2009a; 2009b) account of social democracy, and Brock and 
Carrigan’s (2015) causal explanation of protest activism. Indeed, Bhaskar’s critical realism 
(together with other works of realist philosophy) foregrounds the growing method of Realist 
Evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Pawson, 2006; 2013) being widely used to evaluate 
policy initiatives and interventions as they play out in diverse, complex real-world settings 
(see. Clarke et al., 2007; Greenhalgh et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2016).   
Yet, there is a remarkable absence of critical realism in key SEH textbooks (Smith 
and Sparkes, 2016; Sparkes and Smith, 2013; Atkinson, 2011; Young and Atkinson, 2012; 
Markula and Silk, 2011; Phoenix and Smith, 2013; Armour and MacDonald, 2012) for 
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students and readers alike to draw on. Where it is included, it is, at best, mentioned in passing 
and never discussed in relation to Bhaskar’s wider philosophical debates. Despite this, there 
appears to be a groundswell of interest in critical realism emerging from prominent journals 
in the field (Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health; Sociology of Sport Journal; 
Sport Education and Society; Leisure Studies; International Review for the Sociology of 
Sport; Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology). A number of studies have explicitly used 
critical realism to orient in their research in Physical Education (Simmons and Mclean, 
2016), the sociology of sport (Sugden, 2010; Philpotts, 2010; Green, 2004), sports 
management (Byers, 2007; 2013) and, most evidently, sport and exercise psychology (Plataeu 
et al., 2014; Keegan et al, 2014; Ronkainen et al., 2015; Figgins et al., 2016; Swann et al., 
2016; Schweickle et al., 2017; de Grace et al., 2017; Amoutiviska et al., 2017). While this 
suggests a growing interest in critical realism, there remains little dedicated discussion 
around the philosophical arguments that it makes. Literature that does dedicate space to 
philosophical arguments is helpful (see Downward, 2005; Downward et al., 2006; Downward 
et al., 2002; Weed, 2009b; 2010; 2017; Byers et al., 2007; 2013) yet requires further support 
in the context of considering how critical realism might be mobilised to assist researchers 
while they navigate the contemporary challenges of interdisciplinarity and impact.    
 
The epistemic fallacy, stratified ontology and judgemental rationality 
Among qualitative researchers in SEH, the assertion that constructivist ontologies 
necessitate interpretivist epistemologies holds strong. Markula and Silk (2011, p.36), for 
example, are very clear that “interpretive approaches all assume a subjective ontology and 
thus they cannot be used together with positivist approaches that are based on objectivity”. 
This assertion entails the idea that “we create phenomena” through our research activities 
(Ringrose and Rawlings, 2015, p.87), and that “the measurement of psychological variables is 
itself one more way of making them real, of constructing them” (Willig, 2001, p.8 cited in 
Sparkes, 2015, p. 50-51). However, for Bhaskar, statements like these appear in interpretivist 
(as well as positivist) writings and commit what is referred to as the ‘epistemic fallacy’ – that 
is, collapsing questions of epistemology with questions of ontology.  
A common articulation of the importance of ontology goes as follows; “ontological 
questions and positions are no laughing matter, and therefore before anyone can embark on a 
quest to know something, they must possess an idea about what can be known at all” 
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(Atkinson, 2012, p.148). Here, the epistemic fallacy is evident in the articulation of ontology 
(reality) through a statement about knowledge (epistemology). Similarly, Whaley and Krane 
(2011, p.396) describe ontology as referring to the “nature of being” and then quickly make 
the statement, “epistemology determines what researchers accept as the truth or as real” 
[emphasis added] and in doing so slip between ontology and epistemology seamlessly. The 
literature is replete with such examples. This may be because, as St Pierre (2013, p.647) 
explains, “ontology – always so difficult to think differently – was eclipsed to a great extent 
by what seemed to be urgent epistemological concerns in the last half of the twentieth 
century.” The tendency towards the epistemic fallacy is perhaps most evident in the use of the 
term ‘onto-epistemology’ which Giardina (2016) and Fullagar (2017) both borrow from 
Barad (2007) to describe “the study of the intertwined practices of knowing and being” 
cementing the “inseparability” of ontology and epistemology in conceptual terms (Barad, 
2007, p. 409, cited in Giardina, 2016).  
In agreement with interpretivist qualitative research, critical realism acknowledges that 
the practices of scientific activity are always fallible as a result of being bound up with 
imperfect observational methods – be they sensory (autoethnographic, phenomenological), 
discursive (interviews, focus groups etc.), experimental (randomised controlled trials) or 
otherwise. As Bhaskar (1975, p.16) writes "knowledge is a social product, produced by 
means of antecedent social products". However, critical realism maintains that this is an 
epistemological point, not an ontological one. As, Archer (2007, p.195) states;  
explanation of social matters requires the generic assertion that there is a state of the 
matter which is what it is, regardless of how we do view it, choose to view it or are 
somehow manipulated into viewing it. This precludes any collapse of the ontological into 
the epistemological and convicts those who endorse this move of the epistemic fallacy, 
namely confusing what is with what we take it to be. 
 
This separation is conceived of in Bhaskar’s stratified ontology (see Table 2) entailing 
three the domains of the empirical, the actual, and the real. This empirical domain of 
experience is conceived of as operating on a different level to actual events themselves. In 
making this move, critical realism immediately breaks with qualitative traditions that assume 
interpretivist epistemologies are the logically neccessary result of constructivist ontologies 
(and vice versa) as depicted in Table 1. In this way, critical realism combines and reconciles 
ontological realism and epistemological interpretivism (Bhaskar, 1989).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
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Ostensibly, the distinction between ontology and epistemology allows for the fact that 
events may occur without observation, or may be “exercised unrealised” (Archer, 2007, 
p.190). In asserting this, experiences remain highly interpreted, fluid and relative to human 
agents as are the empirical activities of science, yet these experiences are ‘out of phase’ 
(Bhaskar, 1975) with the actual events that occur which – unless we are talking about pure 
inventions of the imagination – occur independently of perception. Succinctly, if a tree falls 
in a forest and nobody is around to hear it, it does indeed still make a sound. However, as 
Maxwell (2012, p.9) writes, “while critical realism rejects the idea of ‘multiple realities,’ in 
the sense of independent and incommensurable worlds that are socially constructed by 
different individuals or societies, it is quite compatible with the idea that there are different 
valid perspectives on reality.” In the absence of ontological and epistemological separation, 
researchers must rely on “an ontology based on the category of experience” (Bhaskar, 1989, 
p.97). As Archer (1998, p.199) insists, “there is no warrant for confining social causes to the 
mental or to meanings”. This is the case for social structures (institutions, policies, 
organisation etc.), culture (people, practices, artefacts etc.) and matter (bodies, buildings, 
environment etc.) – their construction, fluidity and plurality does not equate to an ontological 
status that resides merely in the perceptions of individuals.  
This stratified ontology is troubling for critics of critical realism on a number of grounds 
(see Chalmers, 1988, King, 1999), but perhaps most obviously because “we cannot talk about 
the reality beyond our knowledge claims, and so questions about reality become questions 
about knowing reality” (Cruickshank, 2004). However, thinking through the idea of a 
stratified ontology permits researchers to acknowledge a sense of realism in spite of the 
obvious interpretive epistemic processes at hand. As Clark et al. (2007, p.525) put it “critical 
realism attempts to find the truth as a goal which avoids judgemental relativism (all beliefs 
are of equal truth value) while retaining the view that human knowledge is socially 
produced.” Further, in Bhaskar’s (1998) terms, 
A core tenet of critical realism is that claims to truth are resolved and compared through 
discussion and debate that seeks, on a rational basis, to identify those findings/beliefs that 
appear to be truthful. 
 
As such, critical realism endorses a ‘judgemental rationality’ whereby theorising, 
philosophising and rationalising can lead to satisfactory conclusions, although these may be 
for-the-time-being conclusions in the Popperian sense. Research may not reveal the ‘true’ 
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reasons why social problems exist, but the language of judgemental rationality will certainly 
aid researchers in showing how some claims are more true than others. Indeed, since impact 
is likely to rest on the notion that there are actual problems (to the best of our knowledge) to 
which we can find actual (evidence-based) solutions, one must at some point acknowledge 
the ontological status of phenomena (social and natural) at hand as real. Without 
relinquishing a healthy scepticism towards the hierarchical structures that produce scientific 
knowledge, a critical conception of reality may help qualitative researchers take a stance on 
matters to the best of our knowledge working with others towards real-world problems in a 
way that the constructivist-interpretivist positions can preclude.  
A further point is to suggest that de-coupling ontology from epistemology is a good 
starting point for resolving the methodological differences that constructivist-interpretivist 
paradigms espouse. Quite simply, empirical observations made through our varied methods 
are relegated to the empirical domain and seen as indicators of phenomena but not necessarily 
phenomena themselves thus demonstrating that methodological diversity do not equate to 
epistemological and ontological incoherence. As Maxwell (2012, p. 103) explains, "data are 
usefully seen as not simply "texts" to be interpreted, or as the "constructions" of participants 
(although they are this), but as evidence for real phenomena and processes (including mental 
phenomena and processes) that are not available for direct observation." Therefore, in 
contrast to ‘methodolotry’ or ‘method fetishism’ (Chamberlain, 2000; 2011) critical realism 
takes what has been described as a “pragmatic" (but not pragmatist) orientation towards 
methods which "does not discard a priori methods that have shown some ability to increase 
our understanding of the world" (Maxwell, 2012, p.10). Indeed, Pawson and Tilly (1997, 
p.85) assert, “we are whole-heartedly pluralists when it comes to the choice of method.” In 
this way, Rutzou (2015, p.6) explains, 
The trained ethnographic eye (an instrument) is able to bring to light certain relations, 
patterns, habits, and dispositions which would otherwise go unnoticed. The interviewer is 
able to disclose what takes place in someone’s head through free or guided discussion and 
is able to get at the reasons, thoughts and feelings of an agent or actor which would 
otherwise remain hidden. A regression analysis is able to highlight certain trends and, 
while not providing law-like regularities, may support and even start to quantify and lend 
credence to other theories, which might otherwise be lacking in evidence.  
 
Once the separation of epistemology and ontology is understood, it becomes 
enlighteningly easy to accept and work with research across different so-called paradigms. 
Hence, using neuroscience to investigate poverty (Hair et al., 2015) or the use of randomised 
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controlled trials alongside qualitative methods to investigate social-class disparities in 
educational attainment (Francis et al., 2017) becomes absent of paradigmatic conflict on 
ontological grounds. Critical realism may be a particularly apposite resource to achieve 
interdisciplinarity because in his later work Bhaskar wrote extensively on interdisciplinarity 
as it related to diverse research topics such as disability studies (Bhaskar and Danemark, 
2007), climate change (Bhaskar et al., 2010) and wellbeing (Bhaskar et al., 2018). There may 
be, of course, a number of other factors that prevent interdisciplinary work from taking place 
but it is hoped that recognising the epistemic fallacy and promoting methodological pluralism 
can at least help diffuse this one.  
 
Seeking causal explanations with the transformational model of social activity  
Now that the separation of ontology and epistemology has been outlined, it is possible 
to explore how Bhaskar’s conceptualisation of social structure may allow research to seek 
causal explanations and lead to a greater attention to research impact. This is crucial because 
for causal explanations to hold any value at all we must first have a conception of social 
ontology which accounts for both agency and structure. While the stratified ontology 
discussed earlier can be applied to the philosophy of science in general, critical realism 
further adopts a specific realist conceptualisation of social structure. In doing so, critical 
realism does not deny that we have individual experiences and perceptions, but it offers a 
conception of how those experiences are made manifest by the social conditions that are real 
and existing. Agency is not neglected within the critical realist conception of causality but it 
is part of an ongoing iteration with the social conditions around us (Elder-Vass, 2010) often 
involving internal conversational reflexivity (Archer, 2003). As such, social contexts become 
important to the understanding of cause because they provide the conditions within which 
agency can be enacted. While there are hints of realism emerging from qualitative research, 
Smith’s (2010, p.99) account of constructivist-interpretivist narrative research demonstrates a 
difficulty and reluctance engage with realism per se;  
while narrative researchers accept that there are physical beings out there moving 
around in time and space and uttering in interviews what he or she calls stories, they 
claim that the interpretations/descriptions they or anybody else offers of these 
movements and utterances are not out there in the sense of being independent of their 
interests and purposes. 
 
While positions like this are perhaps borne out of the important critiques of 
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positivism, scientism and naïve realism, it is neither necessary nor advisable to claim that the 
existence of social phenomena is dependent upon our interests and purposes as researchers. In 
contrast to constructivist-interpretivist arguments, Sayer (1984, p.49) says of social objects 
that, “although social phenomena cannot exist independently of actors or subjects, they 
usually do not exist independently of the particular individual who is studying them.” In this 
case, Archer (2007, p.135) explains;  
this absence of ontological depth precludes crucial questions about the conditions under 
which experience is possible to agency (observing a cherry tree in England depends on its 
prior importation from China, just as experiencing educational discrimination is posterior 
to a given definition of achievement being institutionalised, or owing rent depends upon 
antecedent relationships between landlords and tenants). 
 
Thus, critical realism puts forward the idea that social phenomena pre-exist our 
experiences of them.  In The Possibility of Naturalism (1979), Bhaskar outlines the different 
ways in which social theory has conceived of social structure. He explains that we have come 
to understand the problematic conceptualisations of the Durkheimian ‘collectivist and reified’ 
stereotype  (Society → Individual) and Weberian ‘volunteristic’ stereotype (Individual 
→Society) which most closely aligns with interpretivism. Moreover, while Berger’s 
‘dialectical’ conception (Figure 1) succeeds in avoiding previous errors and encompassing 
structure and agency he argues that this model presents society as an “objectification and 
externalisation of human beings” and that human beings are in turn the “internalisation or 
reappropriation in consciousness of society” (p.33). In its place, he advances a 
transformational model of social activity (TMSA) (Figure 2) which states that: 
society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions 
which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did 
so. Society does not exist independently of human activity (the error of reification). 
But it is not the product of it (the error of voluntarism). 
 
In this way, Bhaskar’s TMSA does not deterministically reify society, nor does it say 
that agents create society. Rather, agents can only ever reproduce or transform it. He goes on 
to say,  
People, in their conscious activity, for the most part unconsciously reproduce (and 
occasionally transform) the structures governing their substantive activities or 
production. Thus people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or work to 
sustain the capitalist economy. Yet it is nevertheless the unintended consequence (and 
inexorable result) of, as it is also a necessary condition for, their activity (Bhaskar, 
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1979, p.35). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
This TMSA follows an essentially Marxian idea that societies are irreducible to 
people which advocates moving from an understanding of social phenomena "as 
conceptualised in the experience of the social agents concerned, to the essential relations that 
necessitate them” (Bhaskar, 1979 p.26). To provide an example, Sayer (1984, p.105) explains 
that the powers of a lecturer “are not reducible to her characteristics as an individual but 
derive from her interdependent relations with students, colleagues, administrators, employer, 
spouse, etc.” What we are left with, then, is a heightened responsibility to take seriously the 
“the persistent relations between individuals (and groups), and with the relations between 
these relations (and between such relations and nature and the products of such relations)” 
(Bhaskar, 1979). Of course, it is important to acknowledge that this realist social ontology is 
not unique to critical realism. Bourdieu’s objectivist accounts of social structure are 
synthesised in Elder-Vass’s (2010) critical realist theoretical work and Mingers (2004) 
provides a persuasive account of the similarities between the TMSA and Giddens’ theory of 
structuration.  
By reclaiming ‘reality’ from the social constructivist positions it is possible to 
demonstrate how qualitative researchers can hold more firm ground upon which impactful 
research impact can be claimed. By articulating social phenomena through the 
transformational model of social activity, it is possible to recognise that agents and 
researchers are implicated in the objects that are under investigation without submitting to the 
notion of ‘producing' or ‘creating' those objects. This contrasts with constructivist-
interpretivist positions which compromise the notion that social problems have an ontological 
status antecedent to individual experiences of those problems and that such social problems 
will be common to other individuals across space and time where objective social relations 
endure. This critical realist claim permits qualitative researchers to move beyond an emphasis 
on highly subjective, interpreted lived experiences and towards revealing how persistent 
relations and social positions produce such experiences which are ‘out there’. This increases 
our generalisability because relations are persistent in societies with reproductive tendencies. 
In short, there is a reality to social constructionism (Elder-Vass, 2012).  
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From this foundation, social science can begin to talk about social structures as causal but 
must avoid deterministic, linear and simplified descriptions of cause. Critical realists and 
interpretivists alike strongly disagree with the positivist notion of causality based on the idea 
that interactions in the social world are quite different to interactions in the physical world. 
Positivistic research is embedded with a version of causality, which, put crudely, contends 
that the observation of constant conjunctions between two events is our best basis for 
determining a causal relationship. Yet, as Bhaskar (1998, p.14) contends, 
As the world is open, and agency is real, and as society is only materially present in 
intentional human action, it follows that social phenomena only ever manifest 
themselves in open systems. 
 
Succinctly put by Archer (1998, p.189); “football players are doing something quite 
differently from billiard balls”. However, critical realists are similarly dissatisfied with the 
constructivist-interpretivist approach which tends to avoid causality altogether. To offer an 
alternative, the critical realist conception of causality is underpinned by the highest domain in 
Bhaskar’s stratified ontology: that of the real in which causal mechanisms with potential 
powers and properties exist. This is important because research inquiry becomes “a quest for 
non-observable generative mechanisms whose powers may exist unexercised or be exercised 
unrealised” (Archer, 1998, p.190). It must be assumed that “structures and mechanisms, then, 
are real and distinct from the patterns of events that they generate; just as events are real and 
distinct from the experiences in which they are apprehended" (Bhaskar, 1975, p.56). By 
separating out the domain of the real in which causal potential resides, Bhaskar avoids the 
mistake of assuming that associated observed events are causally related (as in Humean 
constant conjunctions) or that causality resides in the idiosyncrasy of interpreted individual 
experience. 
For critical realism, causality is complex, context-dependent and can emerge from 
interrelated entities. Sayer (1984) asserts that research should not seek the succession of 
discrete events (cause and effect) but find the ‘causal powers’ or ‘liabilities’ of objects or 
relations, or more generally their ways-of-acting or ‘mechanisms’. He goes on to say, “to ask 
for the cause of something is to ask what ‘makes it happen’, what ‘produces’, ‘generates’, 
‘creates’ or ‘determines’ it, or, more weakly, what ‘enables’ or ‘leads to’ it” (Sayer, 1984 
p.104/5). Thus while committing to the notion of causality, critical realism “acknowledges 
that phenomena exist and operate within open systems and, accordingly, a plethora of 
different contexts and mechanism can affect outcomes” (Clarke, et al., 2007, p.524). 
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However, rather than using the ideas of complexity and context as things that prevent 
generalizable research to take place, Sayer (1984, p.115) suggests that that contexts can 
provide important insights into generative mechanisms: "instead of looking for similarities 
between situations in which a common result occurs, we sometimes seek causes by looking 
for differences between situations in which different results occur.”  
To deal with the complexity of multiple causation, Bhaskar introduces the concept of 
“emergence” (or “synchronic emergence”) which addresses the question of how different 
parts of a complex system work in combination to cause events. As Archer (1998, p.192) 
notes, “to talk about emergent properties is simply to refer to those entities which come into 
being through social combination”. Similarly Clark (2013, p.192) explains that social causes,  
are formed of parts that can be material, human, theoretical, social, or procedural in 
nature, stratified into higher and lower realms, that exercise power individually, in 
combination or as emergent properties either as parts or through the powers of the 
parts and the whole.  
 
Therefore, it is important to “examine how elements of the open system interact to 
influence outcomes” (Clark, 2007, p.527) in such a way that we can say that “the relationship 
between causal powers or mechanisms and their effects is therefore not fixed, but contingent” 
(Sayer, 1984, p.107).  
Crucially, as critical realism is not merely an empirical enterprise, causal explanation 
must be achieved through retroduction. As Sayer, (1984, p.107) asserts, 
Merely knowing that ‘C’ has generally been followed by ‘E” is not enough: we want 
to understand the continuous process by which ‘C’ produced ‘E’, if it did. This mode 
of inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) 
mechanisms which are capable of producing them is called ‘retroduction’  
 
Thus, causal mechanisms exist only in abstract terms as accounts which best explain 
the tendencies (also referred to as demi-regularities) that empirical observations reveal. A 
causal mechanism becomes "a theory which spells out the potential of human resources and 
reasoning” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p.68). 
For critical realists, causality is crucial if we are to move towards explanatory 
methodologies and it assumes a conception of causality which sees social action as a 
complex, and contingent product of social relations whose causal influence operates above 
the level of the empirical. Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) summary in the context of realist 
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evaluation is worth quoting at length,  
The basic task of social inquiry is to explain interesting, puzzling, socially significant 
regularities (R). Explanation takes the form of positing some underlying mechanism 
(M) which generates the regularity and thus consists of propositions about how the 
interplay between structure and agency has constituted the regularity. Within realist 
investigation, there is also investigation of how the workings of such mechanisms are 
contingent and conditional, and thus only fired in particular local, historical or 
institutional contexts (C). 
 
The critical realist conception of causality might help re-frame the purpose of 
qualitative research and open up new opportunities to positively benefit the social phenomena 
that we study. Grounded in Bhaskar's assertion that understanding causality has emancipatory 
potential, Clark et al. (2012, p.2) note that “[e]xplanation matters” and it is needed for the 
“capacity of research to improve outcomes”. Qualitative researchers in SEH might be 
encouraged by examples of critical realism being applied in other fields to achieve impact. To 
offer one example, Clark et al. (2007) describe how their critical realist approach was fruitful 
in researching prevention programmes for Coronary Heart Disease in Scotland. In their 
research, qualitative methods were used to understand the mechanisms that lead to improved 
outcomes, which were only causally linked to those outcomes when situated in particular 
contexts. They embraced complexity and used a range of methodological tools which led 
findings such as “the effectiveness of the programme was determined less by programme 
content, than by social and corporeal experiences of attending and longer-term health 
opportunities to exercise safely” (p.532). Such findings spoke to the research (knowledge) 
needs of practitioners, patients and policy makers and the authors were able to generate 
lessons for the prevention of heart disease in Scotland and suggest changes for future 
programmes accordingly.  
For qualitative researchers in SEH, the critical realist conception of causality may 
allow for greater claims to be made about the impact of our work and may open up new 
possibilities to legitimately seek out causal explanations about the phenomena that we study. 
As has been outlined, causal explanations are achieved through a theoretical (non-empirical) 
process of retroductive reasoning aimed at revealing (or at least claiming) how events come 
to be within complex, open systems. For social scientists, this is important because it entails 
the possibility that research into causal mechanisms is likely to be accomplished through both 
qualitative and theoretical means and hence raising the status and importance of our research 
findings. While quantitative methods with large sample sizes are excellent at drawing 
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attention to regularities giving insight into objects of inquiry, Sayer (1984, p.114) argues that 
“qualitative information is needed on the nature of the objects involved and not merely more 
quantitative data on empirical associations” (Sayer, 1984, p.114). Once we arrive at causal 
explanations, we are in a better position to make recommendations about policies and 
practices that have problematic consequences for the lives of people and social groups. 
Causal explanations are needed in order to make a difference. 
 
Conclusion  
 This paper set out to contribute to current debates about interdisciplinarity and impact 
among qualitative researchers through exploring some of the basic the meta-theoretical 
claims of critical realism. By providing a brief outline of these arguments, this paper has – at 
the very least – offered readers an insight into philosophical debates which are relatively 
absent in SEH literature. Two main critical realist claims have been introduced: (1) the 
epistemic fallacy can be avoided by adopting a stratified ontology and judgemental 
rationality, and (2) social science would benefit from seeking causal explanations 
underpinned by a transformational model of social activity. By de-coupling interpretive 
epistemologies from constructivist ontologies, it is argued that critical realism permits greater 
methodological plurality and hence can help transcend paradigmatic boundaries. Indeed, 
adopting a judgemental rationality may help us take a stance on issues and work with 
colleagues committed to evidence-based claims. Furthermore, by adopting a realist social 
ontology and complex, emergent conception of causality, this paper suggests that critical 
realism permits and encourages impact by asking researchers to focus on explaining the 
enduring social relations that produce real-world problems. In these ways, it has been argued 
that critical realism could begin to answer some of the common criticisms of qualitative 
research and better position qualitative researchers seeking greater interdisciplinarity and 
impact.  
While the arguments offered are intended as food for thought in and of themselves, it 
is hoped that the introduction of key authors (Bhaskar, Archer, Lawson and Pawson among 
others) serves as useful signposting for further reading. Alternatively, on the premise that not 
all qualitative researchers in SEH subscribe to constructivist-interpretivist arguments, the 
value of this paper may be in providing a philosophy and language through which to 
understand and articulate the positions that they implicitly already hold. As such, questions 
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about what counts as proper qualitative research have been problematised with an implicit 
provocation that our methods need not be grounded in constructivist-interprevist 
prerequisites.    
It would, of course, be remiss to not alert readers to the pertinent critiques of critical 
realism for the purpose of seeking transparent debate and inviting counter argument. 
Although a deeper interrogation is beyond what can be achieved here, useful critiques can be 
found elsewhere which questions how critical realism slips between different definitions of 
ontology (Cruikshank, 2004), accuses it of being unclear about how other theories can fit 
within critical realism as a ‘meta-theory’ (Graça Moura and Martins, 2008) and arguing that 
philosophy need not precede empirical science (Kemp, 2005). If, as this paper suggests, there 
is a need for an alternative to the philosophical foundations of much qualitative work being 
done in SEH, then there is also a need to take seriously the hostility towards critical realism 
too.  
It should also be acknowledged that excellent solutions to the challenges of 
interdisciplinarity and impact are being offered elsewhere and that critical realism is not the 
only route which leads to these conclusions. It is encouraging, for example, to read Fitgerald 
et al.’s (2015) attempt to make the division (rather than the combination) of sociology and 
biology seem strange. Indeed, in search of productive collaboration this present paper builds 
on and contributes to the essentially interdisciplinary debates around mixed method (or 
multiple method) research that already exist (Moran, 2011; Sparkes, 2015) and serve to 
highlight the common ground between different methodological traditions (Berry, 2011). 
Furthermore, Smith’s (2018) recent account on the generalisability of qualitative research 
speaks to the issues around impact that this paper tries to address.  
As a result of the advancement in qualitative research in recent years, researchers are 
likely to be well versed in the critical realist tendencies towards complexity, context, open 
systems and the necessity to theorise beyond empirical observations. However, as critical 
realism calls into question many of the underlying assumptions in constructivist-interpretivist 
qualitative research, any interest in critical realism by qualitative researchers in practice is 
likely to involve a story about coming to terms with realism as a concept which is not 
antithetical to the social sciences and the social justice goals we seek. 
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